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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper offers a practical means of qualifying previously 
loaded Type B packages for transportation onsite within the 
DOE complex after years of protected storage, while 
supporting the DOE program to maintain radworker dose as 
low as reasonable achievable (ALARA).  Specifically, the 
paper discusses relevant packaging components and 
introduces part of a surveillance program carried out at the 
Savannah River Site supporting long-term storage of 3013-
processed plutonium-bearing materials within closed 9975 
packages and its application to DOE’s Equivalent Safety.  
Under normal service, maintenance is carried out annually to 
re-qualify the 9975 packagings for leak-tight transportation 
service.  While in storage, however, annual maintenance was 
judged not to provide a significant increase in safety but to 
increase storage operation costs and to violate ALARA 
principles.  Hence, a surveillance program was developed to 
investigate and confirm predictions of storage-related behavior 
of 9975 packaging materials, including the performance of 
O-ring seals and Celotex® insulation.  The combination of 
analytical evaluations with surveillance data is shown 
sufficient to ensure that the 9975 packages can accommodate 
1) time at storage temperature and 2) cumulative radiation 
dose without compromising subsequent performance under 
regulatory Normal Conditions of Transport or site-specific 
credible accident conditions. 
 
I  BACKGROUND 
 
In the coming decade, new plutonium disposition facilities are 
slated to begin construction at the Savannah River Site (SRS) 
under a Record of Decision issued by the Department of 
Energy (DOE) in 2000.  However, until the new facilities are 
operational, interim storage is necessary.  The DOE 
determined that roughly a billion taxpayer dollars could be 
saved if other sites around the DOE complex could ship their 
excess plutonium inventories to SRS for interim storage.  The 
K-Area Material Storage (KAMS) facility meets the need for 
an interim repository.  KAMS is a cost-effective adaptation of 
a building structure that has provided decades of protection 
and security for the SRS K-reactor (shut down permanently in 
1992).  Further, a portion of the building has been modified to 
enhance its protection systems and is now authorized to 
receive shipments of 9975 packages containing “3013-
processed” plutonium meeting the 50-year storage 
requirements of DOE-STD-3013-2004.[1]  A significant 
portion of the KAMS safety basis is credit for the robust 
character of the certified 9975 packaging design.   
 
Plutonium stocks continue to be consolidated within the DOE 
complex, including recent de-inventory of the Rocky Flats 
Environmental Technology Site (RFETS), and thousands of 
loaded 9975 transportation packages have been received into 
KAMS. 
 
II  THE CHALLENGE 
 
In accordance with DOE-STD-3013-2004 and with the KAMS 
safety basis, a program was established for surveillance of 
3013 vessels and the integrity of the 9975 packagings.[2]  The 
program requires access to the package interiors.  However, 
the KAMS facility is neither authorized nor equipped to open 
9975s.  Hence, the 9975 packages must be transferred onsite 
to a separate facility for execution of surveillance actions.   
 
The safety basis for onsite transfer of 9975 packages at the 
SRS is simply the 9975 Safety Analysis Report for 
Packaging[3] (SARP), the technical safety basis for the 
package’s certificate of compliance.  The SARP requires 
“annual”1 re-qualification of the package containment vessels’ 
for leaktight performance.  Once a package’s containment 
qualification has expired, a “Catch 22” dilemma arises.  The 
package must be transferred to a separate location to be leak-
rate tested, but must be opened and favorably leak-rate tested 
prior to transfer. 
 
                                                          
1 The packaging must be qualified by testing within twelve 
months of shipment to demonstrate leaktight containment in 
accordance with applicable portions of ANSI Standard 
N-14.5. 
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Assuming that the leaktightness qualification of every package 
in KAMS can be renewed annually, “Catch 22” can be 
avoided.  However, this benefit would require continual 
management and shuffling of thousands of 9975s within the 
three-dimensional array of packages stacked several-high.  In 
addition, the resulting condition of continual radworker 
proximity to the hazard would conflict with SRS policy of 
keeping radworker dose As Low As Reasonably Achievable 
(ALARA).  Further, recurrent leak-rate testing would mean 
recurring radworker dose associated with removal of the 
radioactive payload from the package to provide leak-test 
personnel with access to the containment vessels and test 
apparatus.  Even less desirable, the leak-rate tests could be 
implemented with the payload still housed within the inner 
containment vessel while the leak-test operator(s) absorbs 
dose and risks contamination of both his person and his 
equipment.  At best, circumvention of “Catch 22” means 
violation of ALARA principles. 
 
The SRS solution to this dilemma follows. 
 
III  THE 9975 PACKAGING 
 
Designed and certified for offsite shipments of plutonium 
bearing materials (including those from the RFETS), the 9975 
packaging is thereby acceptable for onsite transportation 
service at the SRS.  From inside outward, the key 9975 
packaging components are the following. 
 
• 304L stainless steel primary containment vessel (PCV) 
• 304L stainless steel secondary containment vessel (SCV) 
• ½ inch nominal lead shielding thickness 
• 5 inches nominal Celotex insulation thickness 
• Stainless-steel 35-gallon drum with bolted-flange closure 
 
These packaging components are shown in Figure 1 and 
discussed in detail in the 9975 SARP.  Note that the 9975 was 
designed before the recent rulemaking that removed the 
federal requirement for double containment (nested 
containment vessels) of dispersible forms of plutonium.   
 
The SRS surveillance program is implemented to identify any 
significant degradation in the safety performance of the 3013 
vessels or 9975 packagings.  The program requires onsite 
transfer (round trip) of roughly 100 packages annually from 
KAMS to a separate facility for non-destructive examinations.  
In addition, a small fraction of the items will be examined 
destructively.  Data acquired characterizes material behaviors 
and will be used to establish trends for storage-driven changes 
in either 3013 or 9975 safety.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Cross Sectional View of the 9975 Package 
 
The 9975 is a robust, state-of-the-art, certified packaging 
designed for transportation service wherein closure seals are 
not maintained for more than one year.  It was not designed 
for long-term storage service, hence, the need for surveillance 
of the 9975 hardware is apparent. 
 
IV  STORAGE-RELATED ISSUES 
 
Loaded packages residing in protected storage provide a 
relatively stable environment under which organic materials 
can degrade.  Organic materials inside the 9975 packaging 
include Celotex insulation, also known as cane fiberboard, and 
elastomeric O-rings that seal the containment vessel closures, 
see encircled callouts given in Figure 1.   
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Celotex Insulation 
 
The primary functions of the 9975 Celotex insulation are to 
provide structural and thermal protection for the package 
contents against the extremes of regulatory Hypothetical 
Accident Conditions (HAC).  This behavior has been studied 
and evaluated under the regulatory extremes of environmental 
conditions and is documented in the 9975 SARP.  The SARP 
does not require annual maintenance for the Celotex 
insulation. 
 
Hence, undetected degradation of Celotex while loaded 9975s 
are held in the KAMS storage environment is a possibility.  
Recognizing that the SRS is a restricted public access area, 
also recognize that the credibility threshold (event probability 
of 1×10-6/year) for an onsite transfer accident at the SRS that 
could breach the containment of a certified Type B package 
corresponds to tens of thousands of package-miles per year.[4]  
Hence, a deterministic evaluation of HAC is not necessary, 
and the probabilistic evaluation is sufficient to characterize the 
safety of normal onsite transfers of RAM in the 9975.  
However, given that storage-related degradation of the 9975’s 
Celotex insulation was not considered, such undetected 
phenomena could adversely affect the structural performance 
of the package and compromise its Type B qualification.  
Therefore, special onsite safety requirements have been 
implemented as described in Section VII, Onsite Transfer 
Restrictions, to ensure that any undetected degradation of the 
9975 package insulation is not relevant to transfer safety.  
Finally, the stability of 9975 Celotex properties after long-
term loaded-package storage are under ongoing investigation 
as part of the SRS surveillance program. 
 
Elastomer Seals 
 
The 9975 O-ring seal material is Parker Seals fluoroelastomer 
compound V0835-75.  Consistent with other fluoroelastomers, 
this compound has excellent resistance to elevated temperature 
degradation., The compound, typically based on Viton® GLT 
(DuPont Performance Elastomers), was specifically developed 
to improve low-temperature flexibility.  The GLT designation 
signifies peroxide cure (G) and low temperature (LT) service, 
down to -40°C. 
 
After delivery into KAMS, diurnal insolation (sunshine) is 
absent, and temperatures within the package will stabilize at 
levels significantly below those of regulatory Normal 
Condition of Transport reported in the 9975 SARP.  However, 
radiation dose within the O-rings will continue to accumulate, 
eventually affecting the physical properties and performance 
of the O-ring material; increasing compression set and stress-
relaxation.  At some point, the ability of the O-rings to pass 
leak-rate criteria or to seal against pressure may be 
compromised.  Storage-related issues associated with the 
O-ring seals are evaluated in the following sections. 
V  TEMPERATURE-INDUCED DEGRADATION 
 
The range of temperature through which the vendor claims 
satisfactory sealing performance for GLT fluoroelastomer 
O-rings extends as low as -40°F and as high as 400°F.  These 
claims have been tested and confirmed within the context of 
the regulatory requirements for transportation, as documented 
in the 9975 SARP.  However, in a protected storage 
environment such as KAMS, temperatures within the package 
will be significantly lower than those associated with 
regulatory Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT).  The 
ambient temperature in the KAMS facility was measured for 
over a year and less than 0.05% of the readings briefly 
bumped 100°F.  Note that the thermal insulation properties of 
Celotex retard heat flow and thereby provide a more stable 
thermal environment for the containment vessels than 
regulatory NCT.  Assuming a 100°F ambient environment and 
the maximum allowed decay heat of 19 watts from the 
package contents, the maximum temperature of the PCV 
O-rings was calculated to be 181°F (food-pack can payload 
configuration).[5]  However, for the 3013 payload 
configuration, the maximum temperatures of the PCV and 
SCV O-rings are lower at 167°F and 156°F, respectively.[6] 
 
Since the fluoroelastomer material is resistant to much higher 
temperatures, the local thermal environment alone is not 
expected to be severe enough to cause significant degradation 
of the O-rings.  Typically, oxidation is the dominant mode of 
degradation for polymers; however the potential for oxidation 
of the 9975 O-rings is minimal.  Each groove in the cone-seal 
plug that holds an O-ring is designed to be nearly the same 
volume as the O-ring.  When the containment vessels are 
closed, the O-rings are pushed entirely into their grooves, 
taking on the trapezoidal cross-section of the available 
volume.  This condition leaves very little O-ring surface 
exposed to the atmosphere, and where exposure is possible, 
the pre-installation coating of vacuum grease will extrude into 
these regions and protect the surface from the limited local 
atmosphere.  In addition, the highly fluorinated O-ring 
material is inherently resistant to oxidation.  Hence, 
degradation of O-ring properties by oxidation of the 
fluoroelastomer material at the temperature of the SCV 
closure is expected to be insignificant. 
 
This expected behavior is being tested and verified as part of 
the SRS surveillance program in the following manner.  After 
accumulation of a specified gamma dose, special test fixtures 
simulating the PCV closure are heated and held at specific 
temperatures.  The test temperatures correspond to the very 
conservative safety basis values of peak O-ring temperature 
associated with normal diurnal variation within KAMS or the 
maximum allowable continuous O-ring temperature permitted 
by the facility safety basis.  These values are 200°F and 
300°F, respectively.  At six month intervals, the fixtures are 
allowed to cool and leak-tightness is tested in accordance with 
ANSI N-14.5.[7] 
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VI  RADIATION-INDUCED DEGRADATION 
 
Viton type fluoroelastomers are generically resistant to the 
influence of radiation as described below. 
 
“…Viton… can withstand 105-106 rads with little or no 
measurable effect on physical properties and 107 rads with 
moderate effect such as 50% loss of elongation and 50% 
increase in modulus.”2 [8]  
 
O-ring dose rates are developed conservatively as follows.  
The plutonium/uranium metal and 3013-processed oxide 
contents received into the KAMS facility are benign compared 
to the RFETS Sand, Slag and Crucible (SS&C) residue 
materials evaluated previously for (but not approved) 
shipment in the 9975 package.  The SS&C materials include 
(α, n)-reactive fluoride compounds and because of this, dose 
rates associated with the SS&C are significantly higher than 
those from the metal and 3013 oxide.  The SS&C dose rates 
calculated at the O-ring locations within the PCV and SCV are 
2.0 and 0.04 R/hour, respectively.   
 
Crediting removal of the double containment requirement 
from 10 CFR 71.63 implemented January 1, 2005, only a 
single containment vessel is necessary for compliance with 
current federal law, and hence, SRS equivalent safety.  
Therefore, considering only the location of the SCV O-rings, 
the time required to reach the lower threshold for measurable 
effect on physical properties (105 rads) is the following. 
 
tdose threshhold = (1×105 R / 0.04 R/hour) (1 day/24 hours) 
(1 year/365.25 days) = 285 years 
 
Based conservatively on dose rates from the RFETS SS&C 
materials, loaded 9975s may remain stored in the KAMS 
facility for 285 years before the SCV seals accumulate 
sufficient dose to begin affecting their physical properties.   
 
As part of the SRS surveillance program, test fixtures 
simulating a PCV closure are irradiated to a total dose of 
1.75E+5 rads.  This is equivalent to a ten-year cumulative 
dose at the bounding dose rate expected for the PCV O-rings 
(2 rad/hr).  The irradiations are carried out at two different 
dose rates (∼2×104 or ∼2×105 rad/hr) to evaluate potential 
dose-rate effects.  The irradiated fixtures are tested for leak-
tightness and then subjected to elevated temperatures as    
cited in Section V, Temperature-Induced Degradation.  
Approximately 60 fixtures are currently being tested. 
                                                          
2 Such data are usually based on exposures at much higher 
dose rates than expected in service.  Many studies have 
shown that degradation at lower dose rates is often more 
severe, due primarily to diffusion-limited. 
Compression Set and Compression Stress Relaxation 
 
Irrespective of how compression set may build into O-rings in 
service, some measure of this behavior is relevant in static 
applications such as the 9975 containment vessel closures.  
However, materials with severe compression set are known to 
maintain a seal under certain conditions.  Initial qualification 
of the 9975 packaging for extended storage service included 
limited leak-rate testing of PCV closures using O-rings 
artificially aged to 50% and 85% (moderate and severe) 
compression-set values.[9]  Pressure differentials sustained by 
the closure included 500 and 750 psig.  In all cases, the 
O-rings with 50% and 85% compression set tested leaktight 
(leak rate less than 2×10-7 reference cc/sec helium) against the 
500-psig pressure gradient.  Only at the higher test pressure of 
750 psig did the closure seal leak just enough to miss 
qualifying as leaktight. 
 
Therefore, even O-rings exhibiting high compression-set 
(85%) are expected to maintain leak-tight seals in the 9975 
CV designs at internal pressures of at least 500 psig.  This 
pressure is much higher than the CV pressures associated with 
3013-processed plutonium oxide five years after sealing 
within the 9975 package.   
 
More recently, compression stress-relaxation (CSR) tests were 
performed on the 9975 CV seals.[10]  CSR is a direct measure 
of sealing force decay, rather than a simple measure of 
thickness after an arbitrary period of time under compression 
(compression set).  These tests showed that a 90% loss in 
sealing force is observed after approximately 500 hours at 
400°F for O-rings with no lateral constraint and after 1000 
hours for O-rings confined in a PCV O-ring groove.  The point 
of near-zero sealing force is observed at approximately twice 
these values.  CSR values were determined at different 
temperatures in an effort to develop a predictive model for 
seal lifetime.   
 
A sealed PCV recently oven-aged at 400°F for 1500 hours 
also qualified as leaktight and confirmed the O-rings ability to 
satisfy the regulatory containment requirement even at very 
low values of sealing force.  Additional tests are planned to 
determine the relationship between sealing force decay and 
leak rate. 
 
Gas generation within the 3013 vessel is credible only from 
radioactive decay of plutonium (19 watts of 239Pu) and from 
radiolysis of adsorbed moisture.  Helium generation from 
radioactive decay is a slow process, and ten years of 
accumulation (25.2 micro-moles) amounts to less than one per 
cent of the hydrogen liberated by radiolysis of the moisture 
content (25 grams) permitted by the standard.[11]  Accepting 
the standard’s assertion that 3013-processed materials exhibit 
no-net-oxygen-gas generation, only hydrogen is added to the 
local atmosphere as moisture is radiolyzed.  Conservatively, 
all 25 grams of water are assumed to radiolyze completely and 
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instantaneously after closing the PCV.  Hydrogen generated 
by this hypothetical event is added to the gases already 
present, and under storage conditions the combination results 
in pressures of about 225 psig in the PCV and much less in the 
SCV.3 [6]  These pressures under storage conditions (no solar 
heating) are significantly less than the Maximum Normal 
Operating Pressures (MNOPs) documented in the SARP for 
the containment vessels under NCT (with regulatory solar 
heating).  Note that if the welded closure of the 3013 vessel 
does not leak, pressures within the PCV and SCV will be less 
than five psig. 
 
O-ring Seal Degradation Summary 
 
The core question is how much 9975-storage time is required 
before the containment vessel O-rings degrade (defined by 
compression set, stress-relaxation, etc.) to the point where 
ANSI-standard leak-rate4 behavior is no longer acceptable or 
where sealing performance becomes questionable.   
 
Under the environmental conditions expected within KAMS, 
the nature of fluoroelastomer seals is to perform well for an 
extended period of time.  However, at some point, a damage 
threshold may be reached due to diffusion-limited oxidation 
effects, exacerbated by long-term exposure to elevated 
temperature and low dose-rate radiation.  This type of 
behavior has been observed in other elastomer materials in 
other studies.  However, the time required to reach this 
threshold is unknown and dependent upon many factors. 
 
Data that will help answer the threshold question is coming 
from ongoing surveillance of KAMS-stored 9975 packages 
and from the test program.  Hence, authorization for onsite 
transfer of KAMS-stored 9975s and subsequent results from 
testing of O-ring seal properties/performance in support of 
onsite-transfer safety will have to “leap-frog” one another.  
Stated another way, reasonable extrapolation of existing 
package-transfer safety specifically for pursuit of confirmation 
of the validity of the extrapolation is also reasonable. 
 
Some initial data from the long-term O-ring testing portion of 
the SRS surveillance program has been compiled, and the 
results are 100% favorable.[12]   
 
                                                          
3 All inner containers are assumed to leak freely into the 
surrounding containment vessel.  Pressure approximation 
was scaled linearly from NCT analysis results by reducing 
the average PCV gas temperature 93°F in accordance with 
the absence of insolation within the KAMS facility. 
4 ANSI N-14.5 leak-rate testing is carried out at room 
temperature and under essentially one atmosphere pressure 
differential. 
VII  ONSITE TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS 
 
First, the 9975 may be used onsite at the SRS under the same 
set of permissions and restrictions imposed on the package and 
payload by the currently approved 9975 SARP. 
 
Authorization for onsite transfer of 9975 packages stored 
within the KAMS facility would be a straight forward process 
based on the 9975 SARP except for the following.  While in 
storage, the annual maintenance qualification for every 9975 
(including leak-rate testing of the containment vessels) will 
have expired.  That is, the time elapsed since the containment 
vessels were qualified for service by the annual leak-test 
process is greater than two years.5 [5, 13]  For offsite service, the 
packagings would have to undergo this annual maintenance 
prior to shipment.  However, for onsite transfer at the SRS, the 
site’s Transportation Safety Document (TSD) implements 
DOE Order 460.1B, and permits application of equivalent 
safety to the transfer campaign. 
 
Safety equivalence is established in part by invoking transfer 
restrictions established previously to render an onsite transfer 
accident that could breach containment as non-credible (<10-6 
events/year).  These restrictions are given below and eliminate 
the need to evaluate the performance of KAMS storage-aged 
Celotex in structural and fire accidents. 
 
¾ Transfer shall not take place during daily rush-hour 
times (6am to 8am and 4pm to 6pm). 
¾ Transfer shall take place only during "acceptable 
weather" defined as the absence of active National 
Weather Service Watches or Warnings. 
¾ One escort vehicle shall lead the transfer conveyance. 
¾ Transfer conveyance shall operate with headlights on, 
and speed shall not exceed 45 mph. 
 
In addition, the SARP requirement for annual maintenance, is 
relaxed for onsite transfer but only in support of and in 
conjunction with the SRS surveillance program. 
 
                                                          
5 A 9975 packaging may have undergone leak-rate testing up 
to one year before being loaded and sealed for transportation 
that can last up to one year.  Hence, consistent with SARP 
requirements, O-ring seals may remain in service for up to 
two years. 
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• KAMS-stored 9975 packages loaded and sealed for up 
to five years need not undergo annual maintenance 
including helium leak-rate testing of the containment 
vessels in accordance with SARP requirements 
(necessary for offsite shipment). 
¾ KAMS-stored 9975 packages loaded with 3013-
processed materials and sealed beyond five years need 
not undergo annual maintenance, if and only if, results 
from the SRS surveillance program supports projection 
of satisfactory seal performance for at least one year 
beyond the time of transfer. 
 
VIII  CONCLUSIONS 
 
Subject to the operational requirements given in Section VII 
Onsite Transfer Restrictions (requirements are indicated by 
the “¾” symbol), post-storage transfer of KAMS-stored 9975 
packages complies with the SRS TSD requirement for 
equivalent safety assuming the following conditions. 
 
• 9975 package payloads are plutonium- and uranium-
bearing materials processed and canned for 50-year 
storage in accordance with DOE’s 3013 standard. 
• No credit was taken for the seal-welded 3013 container 
(700 psig design pressure) nor for the PCV (900 psig 
design pressure).  Hence, these otherwise un-credited 
features of a loaded 9975 package constitute measures 
of defense in depth supporting the safety of the 
proposed onsite transfer campaign. 
¾ Data from the surveillance of 9975 package 
components following package storage within the 
KAMS facility MUST be evaluated at least annually.  
The results must be favorable, confirm documented 
expectations and support the safety of next year’s onsite 
transfers. 
 
Data obtained from the ongoing SRS surveillance program has 
been reported and interpreted in the 2005 issue of this journal, 
and future publications can be expected as the program 
continues. 
 
The justification process described in this paper is not 
suggested as a rigid course of action, but as an example of 
how the SRS combined available information with a 
surveillance program to reach a goal cost-effectively.  Other 
sites within the DOE complex that may benefit from extended 
storage of radioactive materials prior to onsite transfer may be 
able to adapt the process to site-specific needs.  For example, 
though the 9975 packaging serves this storage mission very 
well, other Type B packagings could be substituted, including 
other elastomer seals and other packaging insulation materials. 
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